This paper explores the intricate issues that prompt water pricing reform in China and India. China adopts a comprehensive pricing framework of cost of resources, treatment and distribution, and environmental requirements, which has been gradually developed part by part since 1980 based on the perception and change of water issues in the country. India follows a simple approach of cost recovery, though its recent policy guidelines talk about more systematic pricing. The results present that both countries fail to realize water pricing policy targets regardless of different pricing structures. But China and India are on the same road and direction of water pricing and China goes a little farther. The treatment of water resources and its services, and property rights have a significant impact on pricing, and costs, including service, resources and environment, are difficult to recover.
Introduction
Water pricing is regarded as the most efficient way to improve water resources allocation and water use efficiency. It is conceptually simple but difficult to implement politically (Rogers et al., 2002) : to select prices and pricing mechanisms to address the non-reconcilable objectives of equity, efficiency and sustainability, is remarkably complicated (Abu-Zied, 2001 ). Therefore, pricing is the most attractive water management instrument and often at the center of water policy reform, but is rarely implemented to its full potential.
In China, with the economic reforms of the late 1970s and the development of an open and marketoriented economy, water pricing has been a consistent hot spot of water policy (State Council, 1997 Council, , 2011 National Development and Planning Commission and Ministry of Construction, 1998; Ministry of Water Resources, 2014) . In India, pricing of water has been on the policy agenda though the focus has been on irrigation water, since the second irrigation commission report in the early 1970s (Government of India (GoI), 1972) . Economic reforms during the 1990s have further emphasized the need for water pricing, including that for drinking water.
This paper attempts to explore water pricing reforms in China and India with an objective of understanding the process, implementation and effectiveness of the reforms in the two countries. The broad objectives of the paper include: (i) examining the pricing frameworks adopted in both countries, (ii) reviewing the process of reform and its implementation, (iii) assessing the achievements of the pricing reforms in both countries, and (iv) identifying lessons that each country can learn from the other. As China and India are the world's fastest growing economies, the comparative analysis also provides insights for policy reforms in the water sector in many other countries and at the global level.
Status of water resources
China and India are the two most populous countries in the world. Apart from this demographic proximity, they differ from each other in many respects -including in social, political, economic and cultural characteristics and in natural resources endowments. These differences are reflected in the way that natural resources are governed and sustained. Water is among the most critical resources for both countries given their dependence on agriculture for the food security requirements of their huge populations. Natural endowments of water resources are critical in attaining the goals of agricultural development and food security.
China
In 2013, China had a population of 1.36 billion (10 9 ), 53.7% of which was urban. Its gross domestic product (GDP) was US$9.3 trillion, of which agriculture contributed 10.0%, industry contributed 43.9%, and services contributed 46.1%. China is now the second largest economy in the world with a per capita GDP of $6,842, ranking it as an upper-middle income economy, according to the World Bank's standard (Table 1) .
China has enormous water resources but they are unevenly distributed in space and time. Annual runoff is 2,711.5 km 3 , equivalent to about 45% of the precipitation and corresponding to a runoff depth of 284 mm. Groundwater recharge is 828.8 km 3 . Excluding double counting, the net total water availability is estimated to be 2,812.4 km 3 . In per capita terms, water availability is only about 75% of Asia's average, and 35% of the world average (Department of Water Resources, Ministry of Water Resources, 1992; Hydrosult, 1999) .
Precipitation varies greatly among regions. The arid and semi-arid zones, with annual average precipitation of less than 400 mm, make up 45% of China's total area. The monthly distribution of precipitation is not even: 50-80% of annual precipitation is concentrated in just four months during flood seasons. Additionally, the yearly variation is significant, with flood years seeing precipitation levels 1.5 to 3.0 times higher than that of dry years in the south, and 3 to 6 times higher in the north. The combination of land and water resources is also not balanced. The area south of the Yangtze accounts for 80.4% of the country's water but only 53.6% of the population, 35.2% of the arable land, and 55.5% of GDP. Runoff in the Hai river basin is particularly low, at 245 m 3 per capita. Even including the net contribution of groundwater, it was only 343 m 3 per capita in 1997 (Hydrosult, 1999; Liu & Chen, 2001 ).
In terms of water resources development, in 2012, the total water supply was 613.12 billion 1 m 3 , 20.8% of the water resources in that year; of this, surface water occupied 80.8%, groundwater supplied 18.5%, and the rest was from other sources. Among these water supplies, 12.1% was used for domestic purposes, 22.5% for industry, 63.6% for agriculture and 1.8% for ecological and environmental purposes. The total water resources development in 1993 was 519.8 billion m 
India
In 2013, the population of India was 1,237 million, of which 31% was urban. India's GDP was US$1.86 trillion and its per capita GDP was above US$1,500, less than a quarter of the level in China. The magnitude and structure of the Indian economy is also very different from that of China. In India, the service sector makes up the largest share of the economy, followed by industry and agriculture. This is in contrast with China, where industry accounts for the largest share closely followed by the service sector. Agriculture still accounts for 16% of India's GDP, compared with 10% in China. The extent of urbanization in India is 31%, far below that of China (Table 1) . As far as water resources are concerned, India receives about 4,000 billion m 3 of precipitation every year. As in China, the distribution is very skewed, ranging from less than 100 mm in Rajasthan to more than 2,500 mm in Assam. Similarly, the runoff depths vary across the river basins, ranging from 210 mm to 1,822 mm. Almost 80% of rainfall occurs in the four monsoon months of June to September. Within these four months, most of the rainfall is concentrated in a few spells of intense rain. It is estimated that in Himalayan rivers, where there are some flows due to snowmelt, about 80% of the total annual flow takes place within these months. In peninsular rivers, where there is no contribution from snowmelt, monsoon flow accounts for more than 90% of the annual flow. The total water resources are 2,302 billion m 3 , of which 1,869 billion m 3 is contributed from surface water and 433 billion m 3 from groundwater. In terms of water resources development, the total water supply in 2012 was 634 billion m 3 , of which surface water occupied 52.2%, groundwater supplied 32.7% and the rest was from inter-basin transfer. Among these water supplies, 6% was used for domestic purposes, 5% for industry, 78% for agriculture and 11% for ecological and environmental purposes.
It is evident from the above that as compared with international averages, both India and China face a shortage of per capita water resources. Water resources development and per capita water use is similar between the two countries, although India is slightly higher (Table 2) . But the variations could be investigated: India has a much higher development of groundwater resources. According to the World Bank's standard, China is now an upper-middle income economy and India a lowermiddle income one; thus China's water use per industrial value-added and per GDP is much higher than that of India. The water productivity of China is 4 times greater than that of India. Because of China's industrial structure, industry is the second largest water user in China, while in India it is the lowest. China's domestic water use per capita is higher than that of India as a result of rapid economic development and urbanization. 3. Water pricing framework
China
China has developed a comprehensive water pricing framework over the years. Five types of fees and charges are included in the country's water pricing framework, related to resources, services and environmental issues: the water resources fee; the water supply tariff for hydraulic engineering; the urban water supply tariff; the wastewater collection and treatment tariff; and pollutant discharge fees.
The water resources fee is a resources charge. The fee is collected according to water resources use as defined in the 1988 Water Law and the 2002 revised Water Law. At present, the water resources fee is collected for industrial, domestic and hydropower use. The fee is based on the actual volume of water abstraction, and agricultural water use is exempted from the fee. The differential fee standards are designed for different uses and water sources. Normally, industrial water is charged at a higher rate than domestic, and groundwater is charged more than surface water. The charges are higher in areas of water shortage (State Council, 2006) .
The 2003 Management Methods for Water Supply Tariffs for Hydraulic Engineering by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) specify that the tariff be formulated according to the principles of cost recovery, reasonable profit, and higher price for better quality and affordability; it should be regulated according to changes in costs and expenditures and the relationship between water supply and demand. The tariff is grouped into agricultural water supply and non-agricultural water supply. Agricultural water supply prices cover costs and operation and maintenance (O&M) expenditures, but not profits and taxes. The non-agricultural water prices cover costs and expenditures as well as taxation and profits. The profit is based on the net water supply asset with a rate of 2-3% more than the long-term commercial bank loan rate (National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Water Resources, 2003) .
The urban water supply tariff, or tap water tariff, is a service charge for services provided by the urban water supply company. According to the State Council's (1994) Urban Water Supply Regulation, the urban water supply tariff is formulated based on the principles of cost recovery and low profit for domestic supply, and rational charge for production and commercial supply. The 1998 Notice on Improving Urban Water Supply Tariff Management by the National Development and Planning Commission (NDPC) and the Ministry of Construction grouped the urban water supply tariff into three groups: household, non-household and special water uses. The tariff consists of water supply cost, expenditures, taxes and profits (National Development and Planning Commission and Ministry of Construction, 1998).
The wastewater collection and treatment tariff is a service charge imposed by the wastewater treatment company for collection and treatment. The 2013 Urban Drainage and Wastewater Treatment Regulation of the State Council specifies that the wastewater tariff shall not be lower than the normal operation cost of wastewater treatment facilities (State Council, 2013) .
The pollutant discharge fee is the environmental charge. The 2003 Regulation on Pollutant Discharge Fee Collection and Management specifies that a polluter who discharges pollutant directly into the environment shall pay a discharge fee, calculated based on the concentration and volume of the key pollutants, with a fixed unit fee system applied across the country. The concentration and volume are determined based on the observations reported by the polluter and the calibration of the environmental protection agency (State Council, 2013) . The 2013 Urban Drainage and Wastewater Treatment Regulation states that those who discharge wastewater to urban wastewater treatment facilities and pay a wastewater treatment tariff need not pay a pollutant discharge fee.
In terms of water pricing management organization in China, all levels of water administrative departments and pricing departments are involved. At the central level, to support counter-level pricing departments, the Ministry of Environmental Protection is responsible for administration of the pollutant discharge fee; the MWR is responsible for the administration of the water resources fee and water supply tariff for hydraulic engineering of cross-provincial water projects. In the province, the provincial water department is responsible for water resources fee standard; and the provincial, prefectural and county water departments are in charge of water supply tariffs for hydraulic engineering depending on the types of water projects. The local pricing departments are responsible for the urban water supply tariff and wastewater treatment tariff, in conjunction with the urban construction administrative department.
India
The Indian constitution has placed water under the concurrent list. This means that while the central or federal government has the concurrent power to make laws in this area, water management in general falls within the jurisdiction of the state governments. States are responsible for the financing, cost recovery and management of all water resources (Saleth, 2005) . Policies or policy guidelines are often made at the central level and enforced or implemented at the state level, but states also make and implement policies on their own.
In India, water rights are based on riparian law that gives the right to water based on proximity. Communities or individuals closest to the water sources (such as rivers or aquifers) have the first right. Groundwater regulation is governed by the Indian Easements Act of 1882, which refers to private property rights over groundwater use (Saleth, 2005) . This Act is adopted from English Common Law, which gives every owner of land 'the right … to collect and dispose within his own limits of all water under the land, which does not pass in a defined channel ' (World Bank, 2010) . Thus, groundwater is treated as an appendage to land because it is an easement connected to land; the person who owns the land owns the groundwater beneath the land. This arrangement significantly impacts groundwater use in India.
The central government (through the MWR) provides the basic framework for water management in the form of the National Water Policy (NWP), issued every 10-15 years since 1987. In the most recent water policy (GoI, 2012) , the water use priorities are set as: (i) safe water for drinking and sanitation, (ii) other domestic water needs, (iii) water for achieving food security, (iv) water for sustenance agriculture, and (v) minimum ecosystem needs. In the 2002 NWP, the top four water allocation priorities were drinking water, irrigation, hydropower and ecology (GoI, 2002) .
The 2012 NWP, for the first time, provided a broad overarching national legal framework of general principles on water. This water framework law (WFL) leads the way for essential legislation on water governance in every Indian state and devolution of the necessary authority to the lower tiers of government to deal with local water issues. The framework recognizes water not only as a scarce resource but also as a sustainer of life and ecology. Therefore, water must be managed as a community resource, held by the state under the public trust doctrine. The WFL also proposes to modify the Indian Easements Act of 1882 by giving proprietary rights to a land owner on the groundwater under his/her land.
As far as pricing is concerned, the new water policy indicates that water should be treated as an economic good. Therefore, it suggests that water may be priced to promote efficient use and maximize the value. Further, the policy observes that while the practice of administered prices may have to be continued, administered prices increasingly need to be guided by economic principles. State governments should establish a water tariff system and fix the criteria for water charges, with the underlying principle that water charges should reflect the full cost of administration, O&M of water resource projects, taking into account any cross subsidy. It may be noted that the water tariffs do not include capital costs, leaving the entire burden of infrastructure investment on the state. It further suggests that volumetric pricing may be adopted after ascertaining the views of the beneficiaries. While the policy does not address groundwater pricing, it strongly advises that subsidies on power (used to exploit groundwater) should be discontinued. At the same time, water pricing should encourage water recycling and reuse, after treatment to specified standards. It lastly states that Water Users Associations (WUAs) 'should be given statutory powers to collect and retain a portion of water charges, manage the volumetric quantum of water allotted to them and maintain the distribution system in their jurisdiction'.
Although the contents of the framework differ between China and India, as shown in Figures 1 and 2 , the general principles for water pricing in both countries are similar: both countries regard water as a social good and provide subsidies for high priority water use, such as household and agriculture. At the same time, both countries want to promote efficiency and cost recovery. India implements a water rights system and China does not, while China levies resources and environmental charges and India does not.
Water pricing reforms

China
Water pricing reform in China has evolved along with development of water resource issues, such as infrastructure construction, water shortage, water pollution and ecosystem degradation, as well as with the increased understanding of water resources. During this process, China has experimented with various forms of water pricing, including free of charge, low charge, resources charge, wastewater treatment fee, and gradual implementation of comprehensive pricing.
From 1949 to 1965, water development focused on the construction of projects, rather than management. Operational costs and maintenance expenditures were covered by public resources. In some regions, very few tariffs were collected in cash or in kind (for example, grain or labor inputs). In general, water was supplied free of charge until 1964, when the Ministry of Water and Hydropower held the first water project management meeting to develop methods to collect and manage water tariffs.
In 1965, China began collecting water tariffs and introduced use and management methods for reservoir projects. The methods defined the management, maintenance and renewal of infrastructure and facilities. Water tariff formulations were based on the principles of 'self-financing' and 'with reasonable accumulation (profit)', and affordability of the beneficiaries. Many users were unable to pay, however, and tariff collection was very difficult. In most regions, water tariff revenues were too low to cover O&M costs.
From the late 1970s until the early 1980s, the government promoted water saving in order to tackle the emerging water shortage problems in the northern and coastal cities. In order to improve water resources management and promote water saving, water administrative departments began to collect a water resources fee in some provinces in North China. The 1988 Water Law introduced a water resources fee on direct urban groundwater abstraction. In 1997, the Water Sector Industrialization Policy extended the collections to aquifers, rivers or lakes (National Planning Commission, 1997). This was included in the 2002 revised Water Law. Over a period of 30 years, the collection of water resource fees has expanded from the North China Plain to the whole of China, from urban groundwater to all forms of abstraction, and from industrial to domestic and agricultural use. At the same time, the collection standard has increased significantly. Currently, a water resources fee is levied for industrial, domestic and hydropower uses based on actual use and on the collection standard at the abstraction site.
During the 1990s, rapid economic development led to growing wastewater discharge into water bodies and serious water pollution. The pollution was exacerbated due to a lack of urban wastewater collection and treatment infrastructure. In 1996, the Water Pollution Control Law stipulated that centralized wastewater treatment facilities would be built, and a wastewater collection and treatment fee charged in urban areas in order to sustain the normal operation of the facilities. In 1998, urban water supply pricing management methods detailed the contents of the wastewater treatment fee, which included maintenance and construction costs of urban wastewater collection networks and plants (National Development and Planning Commission and Ministry of Construction, 1998). Since 1999, the wastewater treatment fee has been collected alongside the urban water supply tariff, but enforcement of the tariff is poor. Therefore, central government has requested the provinces to regulate the fee standard and extended the collection scope several times (NDPC et al., 1999; NDPC, 2000) . In 2013, the Urban Drainage and Wastewater Treatment Regulation stipulated that the collection of wastewater treatment fees should not be lower than the normal operating costs of the urban wastewater treatment facility; if collected revenue did not cover normal operating costs, the local government should subsidize the shortfall (State Council, 2013) . Therefore, the government finally addressed the difficulty in enforcing cost recovery in wastewater tariffs and responded by providing subsidies.
In 2000, in order to develop a water pricing mechanism and institution that meets the needs of the market economy, China issued a Guidance on Reforming Water Pricing and Promoting Water Saving, with the following components (National Development and Planning Commission, 2000):
• To improve fee collection, control waste, and encourage rational use of water resources.
• To increase the water supply tariff for hydraulic engineering to a reasonable level by clarifying costs and expenditures of water projects based on the multiple functions of the projects, such as flood control, water supply, hydropower, fishing, tourism, etc. The guiding principle is that those functions that serve the public interest could be covered by governmental resources and those that do not should be covered by tariff revenue.
• To regulate the urban water supply and treatment tariff by gradually increasing the wastewater fee to a rational level to cover reasonable costs and realize a profit.
• To strengthen the rural water supply tariff by reducing leakage, implementing volumetric charges and reducing additional charges.
• To develop the water pricing system to promote water saving, implement a quota-exceeding increasing block tariff structure, and implement a capacity and volume two-part tariff charging both on supplied capacity and real water usage.
Since the introduction of this framework, China has continued to improve its water pricing practices. In 2009, the Notice on Improving Related Issues of Urban Water Supply Tariff Management improved regulation procedures, for example with cost-auditing and public hearings; introduced the block tariff for household use and quota-exceeding increasing block tariff for non-household use; and fully considered the ability to pay of low-income households (NDRC, 2009) . In terms of the agricultural water tariff, the 2011 Decision on Accelerating Water Sector Development and Reform promoted comprehensive agricultural water tariff reform by means of subsidizing in-quota use and overcharging exceeding-quota/plan use; and at the same time aimed to save water, reduce water expenditure of farmers and improve infrastructure (State Council, 2011) . In terms of the household water tariff, in 2013, NDRC and the Ministry of Housing and Urban and Rural Development requested to enlarge the application of the block tariff and to improve the tariff structure before the end of 2015 for all cities (NDRC et al., 2013) . By 2014, many cities had developed the block tariff structure, including Beijing and Shanghai.
China's water pricing reform is dictated by problems in development, use and protection of water. During the 1950-1960s, when China emphasized infrastructure development, water was provided free of charge. Around 1980, a water resources fee was levied to tackle growing urban water shortages. In the 1990s, a wastewater treatment fee was introduced to control water pollution. With multiple objectives, China's water policy reform has become more and more complex: one single policy change could impact the entire pricing and water resources system. The reform process failed to realize its targets and solve China's water problems.
Despite this, the reforms collected 13.6 billion RMB (about $2.22 billion) in water resources fees at the national level in 2011 (MWR, 2011) The urban water tariff has shifted from welfare to commodity. The urban water tariff in most cities has realized cost recovery and the average water tariff increase has been more than 20% in recent years ( Ji, 2009 Zhou, 2010) . Many cities have now introduced the increasing block-tariff structure, and all cities are required to develop the block-tariff system (NDRC et al., 2013) .
In 2012, water supply for agricultural irrigation cost 0.2589 RMB/m 3 . Of this, the estimated cost of water supplied by the state-owned enterprises (which normally operate the large-scale and key projects) was 0.1751 RMB/m 3 and the cost of water supply at the end-canal (village level) system was 0.0838 RMB/m 3 . The agricultural water charge was 0.0919 RMB/m 3 , about 35.5% of the cost. Water charges by the state-owned enterprise were 0.0621 RMB/m 3 against the cost at the end-canal system of 0.0298 RMB/m 3 . The average collection rate of agricultural water charges was 75.97% (MWR, 2013a (MWR, , 2013b .
In water resources development and use, while China's GDP has increased annually by about 10%, water resources development has lagged far behind: some regions have realized 'zero-increase' during the last 10 years. Water usage per RMB 10,000 GDP (price in 2000) has decreased from 2,909 m 3 in the early 1980s to 297 m 3 in 2007, and per RMB 10,000 industrial value-added (price in 2000) has decreased from 953 m 3 to 163 m 3 during the same period (Chen, 2009) . At the end of 2011, the effective irrigated area increased to 11.47 million ha and grain production increased to more than 250 million tons, with zero-increase of irrigation water use over a period of 30 years. Irrigation water use efficiency increased from 0.30 to 0.51, and irrigation water usage decreased from 7,185 m 3 per ha to 5,505 m 3 per ha. But the water productivity is less than 1.2 kg/m 3 (Chen, 2012) , low compared to the international standard.
India
In India, water was treated as a productive resource rather than an income-generating economic resource until the 1990s. This philosophy is very well reflected in the second irrigation commission's (1972) suggestion that water price should relate to the benefits accruing to the farmers rather than the costs incurred by the department (GoI, 1972) . Water is the main input of food grain production, and with the green revolution and concerns over food security in the late 1960s and 1970s, the provision of water at any cost to the farmers became a policy objective. Water pricing thus has been treated as a necessity to maintain the financial stability of the irrigation departments rather than an economically desirable policy. However, canal irrigation water was never supplied free of charge to the farmers, though the charges vary across the states, since the pricing of water falls under state jurisdiction. In most Indian states, irrigation charges are combined and collected along with land tax or revenue. The difference in land taxes between dry and irrigated areas is the irrigation water charge.
In the initial years of irrigation development, coupled with the advent of green revolution technologies, the cost of providing irrigation in relation to its benefits was low. This in fact encouraged governments to expand the area under irrigation. But by the mid-1980s, the cost of provision began to rise sharply as irrigation expanded to more difficult areas. In addition, it is politically unfavorable to increase water rates. The gap between costs and revenues from irrigation has been increasing. The increasing populism of competing political parties has also adversely affected the recovery of even these meagre water rates, resulting in dwindling departmental finances. This growing financial burden initiated a debate on water pricing in the late 1980s.
India's first national policy on water was adopted in 1987, and formed the basis for the subsequent water policies of 2002 and 2012. The 1987 water policy states that:
'Water rates should be such as to convey the scarcity value of the resource to the users and to foster the motivation for economy in water use. They should be adequate to cover the annual maintenance and operation charges and a part of the fixed costs. Efforts should be made to reach this ideal over a period, while ensuring the assured and timely supplies of irrigation water. The water rates for surface water and groundwater should be rationalized with due regard to the interests of small and marginal farmers.' 'The 2002 water policy re-emphasized that water charges should:
'…cover at least the operation and maintenance costs of providing the service initially and a part of the capital costs subsequently. These rates should be linked directly to the quality of service provided. The subsidy on water rates to the disadvantaged and poorer sections of the society should be well targeted and transparent.'
While the policy pronouncements remained the same over the decade between 2002 and 2012, there was no change in the pricing at the implementation level. Thus the policy pronouncements largely remained on paper, while implementation was guided by political factors.
2012 marked the first time the NWP referred to water as an economic good, not just a resource to meet basic needs. It suggests that 'differential pricing for basic needs, volumetric pricing, incentives for recycling water and the establishment of a state water regulatory authority are the measures suggested in the second draft'.
The national policy guidelines on water pricing have been very loose. From the beginning, the policy has mandated O&M cost recovery. But, it was neither enforced nor given any time frame for implementation: it refers to a period of time without specifying the exact period. The same is the case with later guidelines on capital cost recovery (GoI, 2002) and volumetric pricing beyond basic needs (GoI, 2012) . While recovery of O&M costs is far from achieved, metering of irrigation water is very difficult to implement. Some states, like Andhra Pradesh, have failed to implement irrigation metering due to political opposition.
In India, groundwater is managed by private individuals and hence not priced. Groundwater policies encourage over-exploitation. These policies provide incentives for groundwater developments such as subsidized credits, and for groundwater exploitation, such as subsidized power or diesel/kerosene. While these policies have helped promote groundwater development in regions where groundwater development was below potential, they have led to over-exploitation in resource-fragile regions. The primary victims are the poor, especially small and marginal farmers. While small and marginal farmers mostly own open wells, medium and large-scale farmers dominate the ownership of bore wells. As a result of degradation, the majority of small and marginal farmers have lost or are losing access to water, as the water tables go down and open wells dry up. Even if these farmers own bore wells, they cannot compete with medium and large-scale farmers in deepening the wells (Reddy, 2005) . As a result, these farmers are denied their genuine share in the common-pool resources. Some have observed that groundwater markets will take care of the equity problems to a large extent (Shah, 1993) . But evolution of water markets is possible only in the regions where sufficient groundwater is available. Markets do not evolve when there is not enough water to share or sell (Reddy, 1999) . This is true in many regions where groundwater markets do not operate, as the available water is not enough to irrigate the well owner's land. Pricing of groundwater offers greater potential for achieving equity and meeting resource conservation objectives. As groundwater is the single largest source of irrigation and domestic water supplies, reforms in groundwater governance are important and urgent.
As compared with groundwater, pricing is much more organized in the case of domestic water, especially in the urban areas. Water supplies are metered in most of the class 1 (population of 100,000 and above) and class 2 (population of 50,000 and above) towns. Volumetric prices are the norm across urban India. The increasing block rate tariffs are used in most states, with higher rates charged for commercial and industrial use. Charges for sewerage treatment and disposal are combined with water charges. The costs of water treatment and disposal are not assessed for the purpose of pricing, however, because wastewater in urban areas is typically not treated. The extent of sewerage treatment is less than 10% in cities with no sewerage treatment plants (STPs) and just 30% for cities equipped with STPs (Kurian et al., 2013) . STPs are mostly found in cities with populations above 200,000. Treated and untreated wastewater is often released into rivers or surface water bodies which are traditionally used for irrigation purposes as well as household activities (e.g. washing, kitchen gardens). Even the urban water rates do not have any rationale and they barely cover O&M costs. Most urban water and sanitation departments are running a deficit (Reddy & Mahendradev, 2009 ). The remaining small urban areas use flat rates and, in most cases, supply water on alternate days. Across India, public supplies (stand posts) are not charged.
In the case of rural drinking water, flat rates are charged for house connections. The state governments have guidelines on water rates, but it is the prerogative of the panchayati raj (village administration) to decide on the price of water. In rural India a majority of the population depends on public stand posts or other sources (hand pumps, tanks, streams, etc.). The financial situation of the village institutions is very poor, as most villages are not in a position to pay for the electricity they use for pumping water. Sewerage treatment and disposal is marginal in rural India.
In India, water is charged by the suppliers irrespective of the source of the water. Irrigation water is supplied by public systems like irrigation departments. The public supply source is mostly surface water. There are public bore wells for irrigation in some states, and water from these wells is charged. In the case of drinking water and commercial water, public agencies -water and sanitation departments or public health and engineering departments -charge a water fee. Drinking and commercial water supplies are sourced from ground as well as surface water sources. There is no charge for those who exploit groundwater with their own investments. That is, water as a resource is not charged. There is no price discrimination based on scarcity of water. Variations in water price are due to differences in operational costs across locations. The environmental or existence value of water is not taken into account while setting the water prices.
Irrigation water prices vary across states in India and prices are below working expenses in all cases (Table 3) . While Punjab abolished water rates in 1997, water rates were last revised decades back in some states, for example Tamil Nadu (1962) and Kerala (1974) . Similarly, no water rate is levied for agricultural purposes in most of the north-eastern states except Manipur. Odisha charges a flat basic compulsory water rate for paddy cultivation in all major and medium projects irrespective of water usage, while crop-specific rates are charged for other crops. In West Bengal, water from minor systems is supplied only on a pre-payment basis. In Jammu and Kashmir, Haryana, West Bengal and Kerala, the variations in water rates appear to be marginal. In most states, public water supplies for irrigation are levied on the basis of the area irrigated in the case of irrigation by surface water, while water charges are levied on the basis of number of hours of watering or volume of water in the case of public tube-well irrigation. The rates for perennial and summer crops are often higher than those of other crops (www. mowr.gov.in/problems/pricing.htm).
One of the few success stories in irrigation reform is Andhra Pradesh, where the water sector reforms were aimed at financial sustainability of irrigation systems through price reforms. Though water rates have increased three-fold, they are still short of O&M expenditure. The Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) act specifies a user contribution of 15%, but there is no evidence of any contribution from farmers. In fact, there are no efforts to collect this contribution. On the contrary, often only 60% of the irrigated area is reported for the collection of water charges, and officials take the charges on 20% of the area as their share. Effectively the farmer pays for only 80% of the area irrigated. These mutually beneficial arrangements are widespread in the regions where WUAs are not strong. In fact, in some cases the irrigation department has not yet revealed the details of the command area under each WUA. There is a widespread feeling that the department does not want to strengthen the WUAs, as their continuation will go against the department's interests. In some regions, WUAs have turned into political entities. Moreover, in a majority of the cases, contractors have become WUA presidents. As a result, WUAs have become money-making ventures rather than serving their purpose of sustainable water management (Reddy, 2003) .
In Rajasthan, where more than 800 WUAs have been constituted, the progress has been slow in terms of devolving the roles and responsibilities. Water rates were revised only once, in 1999. So far no devolution of powers has taken place, as the irrigation department does not appear to be keen on devolving the powers. These associations should be made autonomous, under the guidance of the irrigation department, and should be entrusted with rights and responsibilities of water distribution, O&M, fixing water prices, fee collection, etc. Unless WUAs fully evolve in these aspects they remain ornamental. One way of keeping them alive is by conducting regular elections, but they should not be made dependent on external funds (Reddy & Mahendradev, 2009 ). The story is not any different even in Odisha (Das, 2006) .
Under existing institutional arrangements, pricing on a cost basis may not lead to sustainable water systems in terms of efficient allocation of water or financial viability. For, in the given institutional set up in the Indian irrigation system, recovery rates are very low and continue to decline. The percentage of recovery across India (the ratio of gross receipts to working expenses) has declined from 92.9% in 1976-77 to 5.7% in 1999-2000 . When the interest on capital outlay is included, recovery rates have declined from 36.4% in 1976 36.4% in -76 to 5.7% in 1999 36.4% in -2000 36.4% in (CWC, 2004 ). The story is no different at the state level, where the average recovery is less than 5%. The gap between demand (estimated) and actual collection of irrigation charges is quite substantial in a number of states. Apart from Punjab and Haryana, collections are less than demand in all the states -ranging from 34% in West Bengal to 92% in Uttar Pradesh (Deshpande & Narayanmoorthy, 2006) . Given existing political and institutional conditions, it is unlikely that higher water rates would lead to better recovery. This point has been proved in the case of Andhra Pradesh where increased water rates have been accompanied by declining recovery rates despite the introduction of institutional changes at all levels (Reddy, 2004) . The main reason for this trend is the lack of devolution of powers to WUAs, in terms of assessment and fee collection. Given this background, the adoption of first-best solutions, like volumetric pricing based on marginal cost calculations, appears highly unlikely.
Similarly, groundwater pricing does not reflect its scarcity value. Often groundwater use is regulated through electricity pricing. While a cost-based power tariff is useful in limiting over-exploitation, it would be more appropriate to add the scarcity rent of water to the tariff. A precondition for this is to minimize the risk and uncertainties in groundwater and availability of electricity. Large-scale public investments in replenishing mechanisms, like renovations of traditional tanks, rainwater harvesting structures, etc., are necessary. These investments could be cross-subsidized from the revenues generated in the canal command areas. More importantly, institutional arrangements such as making groundwater a real common pool resource and exploiting it on a community basis are critical for equitable distribution and sustenance of the resource.
There are no detailed estimates of water use efficiency and water productivity across India, although there are some regional studies that address water productivity of a few crops. The water productivities of wheat vary from 0.47 kg/m 3 in central Narmada valley to 2.61 kg/m 3 in eastern Uttar Pradesh. In the case of rice, water productivities range between 0.41 kg/m 3 in Sabarmati basin to 3.69 kg/m 3 in Punjab (Kumar et al., 2008) . These productivities are not linked to water prices. Punjab, which has high productivity rates, abolished a water fee after 2005.
In India, as in China, agricultural water pricing gradually evolved from trying to cover O&M expenditures to covering capital costs as well, in order to promote efficient water use and sustain irrigation providers. Due to the social characteristics of irrigation, however, all economic instruments failed to achieve their objectives. Urban water tariffs are being managed in a more systematic way, although there is a long way to go before cost recovery is achieved. Similarly, wastewater treatment also has not realized cost recovery, due to significant fixed costs and investment in infrastructure.
Comparison and lessons
While China and India are demographically similar, they differ in terms of their economic strengths and structure. Both countries have substantial potential in water resources, though both fall in the water stress category in terms of per capita availability. As far as resource development is concerned, India seems to be ahead of China. Due to the demographic and economic differences, their water allocations vary widely. While industrial and domestic water use accounts for 35% of all water use in China, it accounts for only 11% in India. This is mainly due to the extent of industrial development and urbanization in China.
Water governance is also different, although both countries consider water as an economic good in some capacity (Araral & Yu, 2013; Araral & Ratra, 2016 , Araral & Wu, 2016 . Over the years China has developed and moved towards a more comprehensive framework, where use, scarcity and environmental values along with the service and operational costs of water are considered in water pricing. Although water is treated as an economic or social good depending on use, the final tariff to users is a combination of these aspects. India also treats water services in a mixed way, as both a socioeconomic and a community good, which is very much reflected in its pricing policies. India is more focused on operational cost recovery, though the recent guidelines suggest a move towards volumetric pricing and covering of capital costs. However, political economy factors often block the translation of policies into practice. As a result, pricing reforms in India mostly remain on paper and are not implemented.
India's water policy has not evolved much in terms of price reforms since 1987, when it suggested linking prices to scarcity. The later policies have dropped this aspect. The guidelines do not indicate any economic rationale or framework for fixing prices, and leave the responsibility to do so to the states. Thus, China's comprehensive water pricing framework could offer a good example from which India can learn how to deal with complicated water issues and policy targets, such as water shortages and water pollution control. In terms of reforms, the stepwise pricing reform process seems to have worked better in China. However, China's experience is also a cautionary tale about the difficulty and challenge of implementing these complex aspects of water resource management.
India, while continuing with its riparian law, introduced community management of water to address issues of equity and sustainability. China has state control over water resources and adopts market mechanisms (pricing) to address sustainability and equity issues. In China, groundwater and surface water resources are treated equally as far as management is concerned, and groundwater is charged morewith over-exploited regions carrying higher charges. In India, groundwater development and management is entirely left to private individuals. Although the new framework indicates the modification of the easement law associated with groundwater, it only addresses discouraging subsidizing electricity prices. The introduction of a water resources fee in the 1980s in China is a kind of instrument to improve groundwater management. Most important is that India unbundle its groundwater rights from its land rights first, as most other countries have done.
As far as urban water is concerned, China has moved towards considering water as a commodity rather than a basic need. The entire country has shifted to volumetric and block rate tariffs. Though India also uses block rate tariffs, there is no economic rationale for fixing the rates. China adopts the 'polluter pays principle' and levies charges on those who discharge effluents or treatment charges if they discharge to treatment plants. The framework is applicable for the entire country. The new water policy in India suggests that water pricing should encourage wastewater treatment, recycling and reuse, without acknowledging that this is possible only when marginal cost pricing is adopted. In China, subsidies were introduced in the case of wastewater management when it was realized that recovery of waste treatment charges is low. On the contrary, all forms of water supply are subsidized in India. China has moved away from a model of free and low water prices, while India seems to continue -if not strengthen -such a model.
As far as water price implementation is concerned, China is much more advanced than India. China is progressing towards an economic rationale and enforcing it, while India seems to be on a retrogressive path in this regard. Water rates in China are being revised regularly and collecting higher revenues. In India, irrigation water rates are either stagnant or declining and the recovery rates (revenues) have dwindled over the years. Groundwater, which accounts for more than 50% of the area irrigated, is not charged at all. The main difference is that China depends on the state machinery to implement water sector and price reforms, whereas India is trying to do it through participatory institutional arrangements (WUAs) and reforms at the state level. The reform process under the state machinery in China seems to be effective, but the success of WUAs in India is very limited.
In fact, strictly, both countries have failed to realize their water pricing policy targets. Although China and India intend to adopt the same water pricing road and direction to achieve sustainable, efficient, effective and equal water resources management, India has clearly failed in terms of price reforms. China is ahead of India in terms of adopting market approaches, while India is progressing towards participatory institutions. While China's market (price) reforms have yielded substantial benefits, India's institutional reforms are still at an experimental stage. Thus, water sector reforms in China and India provide very useful lessons and suggestions for cross learning:
• A clear approach to water as an economic or social resource and boundaries for the differentiation is necessary for a systematic reform process. The demarcation between social and economic needs of water are fuzzy and fluctuating in both countries' water pricing practices, more so in the Indian case.
• Clarity in property rights in water is a necessary condition for the success of price reforms. While this clarity is evident in the case of China (water rights fall under state control), it is vague in India. As a result, neither the federal government nor the state governments nor the communities take full responsibility for managing the resource.
• A comprehensive approach to water resources (groundwater, surface water, etc.) and uses (domestic, irrigation, industry, environment, etc.) is necessary for sustainable management. The linkage in the water cycle and connections in water service provision require an integrated water pricing approach to coordinate multiple objectives. Such a comprehensive approach is conspicuously absent in the Indian case.
• Following economic principles (cost-based pricing) or rationale in fixing prices is a precondition for the efficient and equitable allocation of water. Such an approach is missing in both countries (and, indeed, across the world). China, however, is more advanced in adopting the principles than India.
• Water pricing reforms should be socially acceptable. The social aspects of water should be addressed separately from the economic aspects. Selective or targeted subsidies could be one way to address this issue.
• While India's PIM is acclaimed internationally, its effectiveness is rather limited. Moreover, WUAs have failed to achieve the objectives of financial sustainability. On the contrary, state institutions are performing better in China. This could be due to the lackluster commitment to institutional reforms in India.
• Environmental concerns need to be addressed well in advance, i.e. to avoid unsustainable levels of resource degradation. While China has addressed environmental concerns to a large extent, they are still not a priority in India. It is not clear how much pricing would help in addressing these concerns in China.
• Costing is not comprehensive in either China or India. Source protection and environmental costs (externalities) are not taken into consideration. The adoption of life-cycle costing for assessing the projects and budget allocations would help achieve sustainable services.
• Pricing in its present form may not result in efficient and equitable resource allocations in either country. The integration of pricing reforms along with institutional arrangements is necessary to achieve these objectives.
